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THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE – SYSTEMIC 
DIFFERENCES AND LINKS BETWEEN PROPERTY, LAND RIGHTS AND 
HOUSING RIGHTS 
AJ van der Walt 
S Viljoen 
1 Introduction 
Our purpose in this paper is to argue that, as far as the constitutional promotion and 
protection of social welfare is concerned, there are significant theoretical and systemic 
differences between property, land rights and housing rights. Our argument is shaped 
by the fact that these three sets of rights are recognised and protected separately in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,1 but we argue that the 
theoretical differences go beyond variations between constitutions and bills of rights 
from different traditions and time periods. In our view, there are sound theoretical, 
and therefore also systemic, reasons why it is necessary to at least keep the 
differences between property, land rights and housing rights in mind when analysing, 
interpreting and applying any of these rights in a specific constitutional text. Above 
all, we argue that the reduction of housing rights to just another category of property 
rights might well reduce or even erode the special social, historical and constitutional 
value and meaning of housing rights. The outcome of such a reduction might very 
well be that opposing property rights will continue to outweigh and trump housing 
rights. A similar set of arguments applies to conflating land rights with property rights, 
at least in certain historical and social settings. 
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In this paper we first of all consider theoretical arguments concerning the relationship 
between property, land rights and social welfare. The thrust of our argument in this 
section is that a proper distinction between property, land rights and housing rights in 
the constitution should avoid the libertarian view that the constitutional guarantee of 
property rights is fundamentally opposed to or in conflict with efforts to promote social 
welfare. Instead, we offer theoretical arguments in support of the view that property 
rights (especially ownership) are fundamentally and inherently limited, both by 
constitutional provisions and by legislation promulgated to give effect to them, in ways 
that create space for the promotion of social welfare. We reject the theoretical 
perspective that starts out from the premise of absolute ownership and then proceeds 
to consider the justification of limiting property in favour of social welfare, for instance 
by way of protecting housing rights. The theoretical approach that we find more 
attractive starts out from the premise that property rights are inherently limited in 
various ways, including by way of constitutional and statutory limitations that are 
designed to promote social welfare, with the result that constitutional analysis is not 
restricted to the justification of limitations being imposed on ownership. Instead, 
constitutional analysis might often consist of considering justifications for upholding 
property rights at the cost of social welfare. 
In view of the theoretical analysis, we proceed to consider the constitutional nature 
and status of property, land rights and housing rights in the South African context. 
We argue that both land rights (in the form of land redistribution and improved tenure 
security) and housing rights (in the form of the right of access to adequate housing) 
should be seen as discrete constitutional rights that stand on their own constitutional 
foundations and that they do not need to be protected as property rights. On the other 
hand, they are not fundamentally circumscribed or opposed by property rights either. 
Instead, the Constitution (as interpreted in case law) requires a new, typically 
constitutional methodology that gives full recognition and effect to all three sets of 
rights, each in its proper place. Seen from this perspective, property is neither the 
guardian nor the enemy of social welfare. Nevertheless, the purpose of the property 
clause in general cannot be isolated from social welfare concerns that relate to 
improved access to land and housing rights, nor from the constitutional imperative to 
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provide stronger land and housing rights. Important connections exist between these 
divergent constitutional imperatives that should be acknowledged to ensure the 
efficient realisation of social welfare concerns. 
2 Theoretical analysis: property, land rights and social welfare 
In the normative framework of social citizenship,2 the notion of social welfare pivots 
on the idea that individuals (and, presumably, groups of individuals) have social rights 
that in some way shape social policy on the global, the nation-state and the non-state 
levels. Understood in this way, there is an intricate web of tensions between property 
and social welfare. On the one hand, a system of equitably accessible and distributed 
property is seen as a requisite for social welfare, while on the other hand proposed 
state intervention aimed at the equitable redistribution of property may be seen as a 
threat to extant property rights and thus, indirectly and insofar as security of property 
holdings from state interference is seen as a substantive liberal value, a threat to social 
welfare. An oversimplified analysis of these tensions could easily create the false 
impression that property is either the guardian or the enemy of social welfare. 
In libertarian and similar rights-based theories this tension is portrayed in rather 
simplistic terms, the most extreme of which implies that the promotion of social 
welfare, as far as it finds expression in redistributive state action, poses a threat to 
the security and stability of extant private property holdings, which could disrupt 
economic, social and legal stability.3 From this perspective, the relationship between 
property and social welfare is probably best expressed in the form "property vs social 
                                        
2  As discussed by Davy, Davy and Leisering 2013 Int J Soc Welf, with reference to Marshall 
"Citizenship and Social Class". 
3  In rights-based theory, guaranteeing property is a core reason for adopting a constitution, 
combined with a defensive understanding of constitutionalism that places a high value on state 
minimalism. See eg Epstein Takings ch 2 ("Hobbesian man, Lockean world") for a natural-rights 
perspective that regards the constitutional guarantee primarily as a defensive shield against state 
interference with private property. De Soto The Other Path 189-190 describes wasteful state 
regulation (in the form of state redistribution of resources) in comparable terms. Alexander and 
Peñalver Introduction to Property Theory 56 point out that Nozick and Epstein, the most important 
current Lockean theorists, "have taken us very far from the circumstances that motivated Locke 
to write the Tow Treatises. Instead of a theory of limited private property rights in the service of 
an argument for majoritarian government, twentieth-century Lockeans have offered us a theory 
of limited majoritarian government in the service of private property rights". 
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welfare",4 which indicates that the inherent tension between the two conflicting sets 
of goals (protecting extant property holdings and promoting social welfare) involves a 
choice that will favour one side and harm the other.  
However, the tension between property and social welfare does not have to be seen 
in such a pessimistic, confrontational way. From a progressive viewpoint it is said that 
private property is so important for human welfare that it should be distributed as 
widely as possible, with the consequence that the equitable distribution of property is 
just as important as the protection of extant holdings.5 This perspective does not 
eliminate the tension between property and social welfare: insofar as social welfare 
requires state intervention to ensure a more or less equitable distribution of some or 
all resources, at least some property will inevitably be taken away from the haves to 
be redistributed to the have-nots.6 However, progressives who favour social-welfare 
redistribution will present policy-making and administrative and judicial choices 
between conflicting property and social-welfare interests in terms of a balancing 
process that is aimed at rationalising the choice between the conflicting interests and 
minimising the harm that results from it.7 The balancing process is intended to remove 
some of the sting of the redistributive intervention. 
In his work on property theory, Alexander8 explains the relationship between property 
and social welfare from a particular iteration of the progressive-property perspective, 
                                        
4  See eg Epstein Takings 319: "The fundamental problem in a system of welfare is that it conflicts 
with the theory of private rights that lies behind any system of representative government"; 322: 
"The basic rules of private property are inconsistent with any form of social benefits"; 324: "With 
the possible exception of charitable deductions, the eminent domain clause in principle forecloses 
virtually all public transfer and welfare programs, however, devised and executed, except in very 
narrow and limited circumstances captured by the police power and implicit in-kind compensation". 
5  See eg Barros 2009 NYU J L & Liberty 50-51; Amar 1990 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 37. 
6  At the moment we are not specifying the form that redistribution might assume; as appears below, 
it can adopt a range of forms such as large-scale regulatory regime changes, expropriation of 
individual property holdings and individual regulatory title adjustments. 
7  See eg Merrill "Private Property and Public Rights" 98 (explaining that one of the normative 
guidelines for choosing between public rights doctrines is subsidiarity, which means that one 
should select the doctrine that corrects the problem with the least interference with private rights). 
8  See most recently Alexander 2014 Iowa L Rev 1260. Elsewhere Alexander explains that his human 
flourishing theory rests on two related characteristics, namely that human beings develop the 
capabilities that are necessary for a well-lived and distinctly human life only in society with other 
human beings; and that human flourishing at least includes the capacity to make meaningful 
choices among alternative life horizons, to discern the differences between them, and to deliberate 
deeply about what is valuable within those alternatives: Alexander and Peñalver 2009 Theo Inq L; 
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which describes what might otherwise be understood as social welfare in terms of a 
neo-Aristotelian, value-ethics theory of human flourishing. On the one hand, he 
identifies human flourishing, defined as the opportunity for a person to live a life that 
is as fulfilling as possible, as the normative foundation of property. On the other hand, 
he insists that the values that are among the intended ends of private property, such 
as individual autonomy, personal security, and self-determination, are not 
incompatible with fundamental public values. In fact, at times the realisation of 
private-property values requires the recognition of public values.9 Human flourishing 
includes both private and public values; a perspective that at least seems to remove 
the debate from the binary property-vs-regulation logic of libertarian and rights-based 
theory. In line with the notion that property's ends are both private and public and in 
response to the argument that governance strategies10 feature only on the periphery 
of the property system,11 Alexander12 explains that many or perhaps even most 
property institutions include some kind of governance property that requires 
governance norms. Human flourishing is promoted by a social-obligation norm that 
recognises the relational nature of human flourishing in society: to avoid self-
contradiction, we must make the same normative commitment to developing the 
capabilities that are required for human flourishing in others as we commit to 
developing in ourselves. This social-obligation norm implies a commitment to social 
welfare that is deeply embedded in the very notion of property:  
If human capacities such as survival (including physical health), the ability to engage 
in practical reasoning, and to make reasoned decisions about how to live our lives 
are components of the well-lived life, then surely we are all obligated to support and 
                                        
Alexander 2009 Cornell L Rev 760-773. Alexander emphasises that human flourishing is pluralistic 
(in the sense that there is not a single, irreducible, fundamental moral value to which all other 
values can be reduced) and objectivist (in the sense that value determinations are not simply a 
matter of "agent sovereignty"). 
9  Alexander 2014 Iowa L Rev 1260. 
10  Defined with reference to regulatory limitations that restrict the property owner's core right to 
exclude others. See Merrill and Smith 2001 Columbia L Rev 791-792 (explaining the choice between 
exclusion and governance as strategies for regulating the use of resources). 
11 Merrill and Smith 2001 Yale LJ 359; Merrill and Smith 2007 Wm & Mary L Rev 1850; Smith 2009 
Cornell L Rev 963-971.  
12  Governance property is described as multiple-ownership property and governance norms as 
devices that regulate the internal relations of ownership: Alexander 2012 U Pa L Rev 1856. 
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nurture the social structures without which those human capabilities cannot be 
developed.13  
In practice, this means that private property holding does not take place in an 
exclusionary private enclave – even individual property holding is deeply embedded in 
a larger social process of participation in and support for the social structures that 
develop those human capabilities that make human flourishing possible.14 
Alexander's human-flourishing argument could easily be misconstrued as a variation 
of the libertarian argument that property is in fact the guardian of all other rights, 
including social welfare rights. However, that would miss the point of the progressive-
property argument. The fallacy is illuminated by another progressive-property scholar, 
Singer, who argues that although property is important for individual liberty, regulation 
(including what we might call social-welfare regulation) is an inherent part of 
property,15 with the result that there is no room in the progressive-property theory for 
the notion that liberty is best secured in a system that is as free as possible of state 
intervention. The security and independence that property ownership brings, Singer 
explains, increase our individual liberty by giving us the space and the resources to 
lead our lives according to our own design, but a free market society will very likely 
                                        
13  Alexander 2009 Cornell L Rev 769. At 770 Alexander acknowledges that the social obligation cannot 
be a matter of strict reciprocity, at least not in the particulars of what we give back or to whom. 
The reciprocal obligation finds expression in the more abstract notion of citizenship (Alexander 
2009 Cornell L Rev 771). 
14  Alexander 2009 Cornell L Rev 773-815 argues that to some extent, albeit partially and confusingly, 
both private and public American property law has internalised, in the form of legal doctrines that 
can best be explained as social-obligation practices, the idea that private property owners owe 
"thick responsibilities" to the communities to which they belong. In support he refers to examples 
that include eminent domain, nuisance remedies, land reform (in South Africa), historic 
preservation regulation, environmental conservation regulation, access restrictions on the right to 
exclude, and some examples from intellectual property law. At 815-818 Alexander analyses 
examples of two broad limits of the social-obligation norm, namely limits (such as autonomy 
interests) that are inherent to the norm, and limits that are based on prudential concerns about 
the proper scope of enforcement of moral norms when a weighty countervailing interest is present 
to oppose autonomy interests. 
15  Singer 2006 Harvard Environmental LR 311 arguably describes the role of state regulation in more 
expansive terms. Alexander 2014 Iowa L Rev 1261 argues that private law "is sufficiently capacious 
to include public law's values and to operationalize them itself", and that certain disputes involving 
public-law values can therefore "be resolved solely on private law grounds without resorting to 
state involvement (other than as the facilitator for dispute resolution through its courts)". 
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leave many people outside of the ownership class unless state regulation "mitigate[s] 
the inequalities" that individual ownership and the market society generate.16  
From Singer's perspective, property and regulation are not alternatives between which 
we choose or that we have to balance against each other – the very property system 
itself is a form of regulation.17 Consequently, instead of thinking about the regulation 
of property in terms of libertarian (defensive) or utilitarian (balancing) metaphors,18 
Singer proposes a model of property that "starts from the idea that owners have 
obligations as well as rights. The image that supports this notion is that of a citizen in 
a free and democratic society".19 In this model, property is "the law of democracy",20 
which means that property must reflect and must be accountable to the fundamental 
choices we make in favour of living in a democracy characterised by dignity and 
equality. Like the law of democracy, "property law is a constitutional problem because 
the norms and values of a free and democratic society limit the kinds of property rights 
that can be created".21 In other words, property is circumscribed, defined, by the 
demands of living in a democratic society – the structure of democracy is both the 
condition for and the guarantee of property. Instead of characterising it as a post hoc, 
external threat to extant property holdings, Singer's progressive theory portrays the 
social-welfare regulation of property as the very foundation that makes a system of 
property holding possible, because it creates the democratic structure within which 
we choose to live. 
In the progressive-property theory espoused by Alexander and Singer, property is 
inherently defined and limited by fundamental social-welfare values and obligations 
                                        
16  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 311. Singer cites authors who echo a similar view: Michelman 1992 
U Chi L Rev 99; Singer Entitlement 141; Waldron Right to Private Property 4-5. In much the same 
vein on this point see Barros 2009 NYU J L & Liberty 50-51. 
17  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 312: "… government action is needed to allocate initial entitlements, 
to define the bundles of rights that accompany ownership, and to adjudicate conflicts among 
owners and between property rights and other legal entitlements. Moreover, many forms of 
regulation exist precisely because they protect property rights". 
18  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 314 explains the libertarian metaphor with reference to the owner 
of a castle who supremely controls all that goes on within its walls, and the utilitarian metaphor 
with reference to an investor in a market economy who is entitled to the legitimate expectations 
flowing from his investment. 
19  Singer 2006 Harv Envtl L Rev 314. 
20  Singer 2014 Duke LJ. See also Singer 2009 Cornell L Rev. 
21  Singer 2014 Duke LJ 1304. 
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that are crucial to social citizenship, to life in a social structure, to a democracy, that 
makes it possible to live the fully human life-in-society they both value. In their theory, 
the social obligation that defines and limits property finds expression in governance 
institutions, structures and strategies; in other words in the state regulation (by the 
common law or legislation) of the acquisition, use and disposal of property. Stated 
differently, the regulation of property embodies the intricate web of tensions between 
property and social welfare to the extent that it expresses the complex interplay 
between the protection of property as a locus of human flourishing and the 
entrenchment of the social obligations of property owners as a matter of social 
citizenship. The relationship between property and social welfare is neither 
dependence (property is the guardian of social welfare) nor opposition (social welfare 
threatens the liberty inherent in property), but rather a systemic issue of correctly 
identifying and assessing the proper place of each in the democratic, constitutional 
and legal system. 
This explanation of the relationship between property and social welfare, inspired by 
progressive-property theory, rejects the over-simplification of libertarian and rights-
based theory and implies a definitive choice against absolutist approaches to the 
dilemma of property and regulation. However, it gets more complicated when one 
considers the role and effect of constitutional or statutory guarantees of property, land 
rights or housing rights. On the one hand, a constitutional guarantee of property can 
create (or reinforce) the libertarian impression that the property interest is in the first 
place about autonomy-enhancing individual liberty, with the concomitant effect that 
the regulation of property acquires the air of posing a threat against autonomy and 
personhood. Both Singer and Alexander explicitly include constitutional issues such as 
eminent domain and regulatory takings in their analysis, so as to preclude exactly that 
impression. For the sake of argument we will follow their example and simply assume, 
on the basis of the preceding overview and without further argument, that the mere 
presence of a property clause in a constitutional bill of rights does not create a 
presumptive hierarchy in favour of unlimited property and against state regulation of 
property. Instead, we take for granted Singer's portrayal of property as the law of 
democracy, with the implication that both the use- and social-welfare regulation of 
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extant property rights does not threaten otherwise supposedly unrestricted property 
holdings but in fact embodies the web of tensions between property and social welfare 
that both constitutes and circumscribes the possibility of a private property regime 
embedded in constitutional social structures. We therefore also subscribe to the 
German Federal Constitutional Court's interpretation of the property clause in the 
Grundgesetz (GG),22 according to the question of whether the inclusion of a specific 
object or right under the protection of article 14 GG would serve the constitutional 
purpose of creating and protecting a sphere of personal freedom where the individual 
is enabled (and expected to take responsibility for the effort) to realise and promote 
the development of her own life and personality, within the social context.23 As the 
Court has shown in its developing case law, the property guarantee does not insulate 
private property against state regulatory action. Instead, it creates and protects a 
sphere of personal freedom described in the laws that determine the content and 
limits of property, within which private property holding is both possible and justified 
in its proper social context, which explicitly includes the promotion of social welfare.24 
It nevertheless becomes more complicated when social-welfare rights, and especially 
land rights and housing rights, are either explicitly guaranteed in the bill of rights or 
linked with the property-and-social-welfare debate, especially in a context where land 
and other social reforms are high on the constitutional agenda. The constitutional 
guarantee or strengthening of previously non-existent or under-valued land (and 
                                        
22  Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) 
1949. 
23  The principle was explained in BVerfGE 51, 193 (Warenzeichen) 218.  
24  The implications of the Court's view for the relationship between private property and social welfare 
have been worked out in a wide range of decisions. For the present purposes the decision in 
BVerfGE 89, 1 (Besitzrecht des Mieters) is particularly important, but the two Kleingarten decisions 
(BVerfGE 52, 1 (1979); BVerfGE 87, 114 (1992)) are also interesting. After World War II urban 
landlords (in many cases local authorities or churches) attempted to regain the use of land on 
which garden allotments had been established during the war, intending to use it for much-needed 
building and development. The Court argued that the garden allotments were important for lessees 
who still relied on food grown there for survival. Consequently, the low rentals and anti-eviction 
measures that applied during World War II were upheld, even where contractual lease periods 
had run out, as long as the lessees desired to retain the use of the gardens and were willing to 
pay the nominal rent. When it was argued decades later that the initial reasons for the protection 
of the lessees of garden allotments were no longer applicable, and after it was demonstrated that 
only a few lessees still used the gardens to grow food, the Court acknowledged the change in 
socio-economic circumstances, relaxed the controls on eviction and made it possible to charge 
reasonable rent, but nevertheless upheld some protection of the lessees because of the new socio-
economic importance that the gardens had acquired in the urban context. 
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housing) rights can paradoxically replicate the absolutism-regulation debate in the 
context of new (or newly recognised and guaranteed) land and housing rights. 
Explicitly guaranteeing land and housing rights in the bill of rights also creates the 
interpretative and strategic problem of sorting out the relationship between the 
general property guarantee and specific land and housing rights. 
Our approach is that a constitutional analysis of land and housing rights granted or 
upgraded in terms of a constitutionally driven social-welfare programme should not 
get stuck in the false "property vs social welfare" binary that characterises libertarian 
and rights-based property theory, nor should it adopt the facile assumption that the 
constitutional property guarantee is the strongest right and that other rights, such as 
land and housing rights, should be brought under its protective umbrella. Instead, we 
propose to discuss land and housing rights in South Africa from a different perspective. 
Our starting point is that a constitutional text like the South African Constitution, which 
is explicitly transformative in its purpose, structure and individual provisions, must be 
approached as a deliberate embodiment, in the sense expressed by Alexander and 
Singer, of a web of transformation-oriented tensions between property and social 
welfare. To establish the pivot point between property, land rights and social welfare, 
one has to start with the constitutional text and legislation that has been promulgated 
to give effect to the relevant social-welfare rights. 
In the following section we first consider land rights in the form of land redistribution 
and improved tenure security in the South African Constitution. Our aim is to illuminate 
the discrete constitutional nature and status of these rights and to demarcate them 
from both property in general and housing rights. We also highlight overlaps where 
the constitutional land rights (both redistribution and tenure security) support or 
reinforce housing rights. 
3 Property and land rights in the Constitution 
3.1 Introduction 
The most important provisions in the Constitution for an analysis of the relationship 
between property and land rights are section 25 and section 26. Section 25, the 
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property clause, is somewhat unique in its structure. The first three subsections 
protect extant property rights against unconstitutional state interference in the form 
of arbitrary deprivation (subsection 25(1)) and uncompensated expropriation 
(subsections 25(2) and 25(3)). The final five subsections legitimate and promote land 
and related reforms (subsections 25(5) to 25(9), read with the interpretation provision 
in subsection 25(4)).25 The land-reform provisions in subsections 25(5)-(9) reflect the 
constitutional assembly's intention that land reform should be an inherent part of the 
property clause, rather than an external limit placed upon it. Land reform, as it is 
foreseen in section 25, includes the restitution of land rights that were lost as a result 
of racial policies and laws under apartheid;26 a wider and more general process to 
                                        
25  The full text of s 25 of the Constitution: 
 Property 
 25. (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application  
 (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
 (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which 
have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
 (3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including  
 (a) the current use of the property; 
 (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
 (c) the market value of the property; 
 (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and 
 (e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
 (4) For the purposes of this section  
 (a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring 
about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and 
 (b) property is not limited to land.  
 (5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
 (6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
 (7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
  (8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other   measures 
to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance 
with the provisions of section 36(1). 
 (9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
 For a discussion of the section see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 15-22. 
26  S 25(7) of the Constitution. 
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promote the redistribution of and equitable access to land;27 and a process of 
amending the laws so as to secure land titles and land-use rights that were insecure 
because of apartheid laws and practices.28 In all three cases, legislation is required to 
bring about the changes foreseen in land reform policies.29 On the surface, these 
provisions may seem to conflict with or even contradict the protective provisions in 
subsections 25(1)-(3), in the sense that both regulatory limitations imposed on extant 
property holdings (for instance to promote the security of tenure of non-owners) and 
the expropriation of private land (for the purposes of restitution or redistribution) will 
inevitably affect the security of extant land holdings. The first part of the property 
clause (subsections 25(1)-(3)), which protects extant property rights, may even seem 
to conflict with the last part (subsections 25(5)-(9)), which authorises land reform. 
However, it is possible to read the section as a coherent whole that embodies a 
creative, transformation-oriented tension without being contradictory. Such a 
coherent, non-conflictual approach presupposes purposive interpretation of the 
section.30 The Constitutional Court made it clear in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers31 that section 25 should be interpreted as such a coherent whole, within its 
historical and constitutional context. Seen in this purposive perspective, section 25 
fulfils a double function, namely to protect property and also to promote land and 
related reforms, which means that the two elements of section 25 embody a creative 
tension rather than a fundamental conflict.  
The property clause cannot be interpreted purposively without considering the 
historical and socio-political context. The Constitution promotes legitimate efforts to 
overcome and repair the injustices of the past, including land and related reforms. In 
                                        
27  Section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
28  Section 25(6) of the Constitution. 
29  A wide range of legislation has been enacted to give effect to the constitutional land reform 
provisions; see eg the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (restitution); Land Reform (Labour 
Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 (redistribution); Extension 
of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997; Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation 
of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE); Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (tenure 
security). 
30  Du Plessis "Interpretation" 52-56 provides an overview of case law in which purposive 
interpretation was adopted and explained. 
31  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
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this historical and constitutional context, land reform cannot be seen as an 
extraordinary imposition on property rights that are basically protected by section 25. 
Extant property holdings are indeed protected against arbitrary deprivation and 
uncompensated expropriation, but then in the context of "… the need for the orderly 
opening-up or restoration of secure property rights for those denied access to or 
deprived of them in the past", with the result that the purpose of section 25 is "… both 
… protecting existing private property rights as well as serving the public interest ... 
and … striking a proportionate balance between these two functions".32 Regulatory 
policies and laws aimed at land and other reforms can therefore not be seen as 
extraordinary, ex post interferences with basically guaranteed extant property 
holdings simply because they imply that those property holdings are subject to certain 
limitations. Rather, both the guarantee of the extant rights and the limitations that are 
imposed by constitutionally-inspired policies and laws must be seen as parts of the 
same whole.  
Section 25 can therefore be interpreted in a way that echoes the progressive-property 
views of Alexander and Singer, namely that the constitutional protection of property 
does not contradict or conflict with, but in fact coincides with the promotion of social 
welfare, at least insofar as social welfare is understood to include land reform. 
Consequently, legislation enacted to give effect to the land reform provisions in section 
25 must be interpreted and applied as part of the intricate web of transformation-
oriented tensions that section 25 creates and upholds. The courts have decided several 
times that specific provisions in land reform laws, if interpreted from this constitutional 
perspective, do not conflict with the protective function of the property clause.33 To 
that extent, section 25 can be said to authorise and require a progressive-property 
approach to the relationship between extant property rights and land reform. 
3.2 Redistribution and tenure reform 
                                        
32 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 15-16. 
33  See eg Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs 1997 2 SA 621 (CC) (ss 11(7) and 
11(8) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 are not in conflict with s 28 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993); Nhlabathi v Fick 2003 7 BCLR 806 (LCC) 
(s 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 is not in conflict with s 25 of the 
Constitution). 
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From both a global social welfare perspective and the domestic welfare-orientated 
transformation imperative, the state's obligation to enable citizens to gain access to 
land on an equitable basis is a central mechanism aimed at assisting previously 
displaced groups and individuals to establish a place to live and participate in larger 
social structures.34 During the early 1990s the pre-1994 government already identified 
greater access to land as an important social objective, and a number of laws were 
enacted to serve this purpose.35 The redistribution strategy was entrenched in section 
25(5) of the Constitution as part of the land reform programme and has found further 
support in a number of post-1994 laws.36 Redistribution as a land reform strategy 
targets the poor,37 in general, and certain rural dwellers, such as labour tenants and 
farm workers in particular,38 with the purpose of improving their access to land for 
residential and productive uses.39 The constitutional mandate of increased access to 
property in the form of land for housing or productive uses has an inherent social-
welfare objective, because it is aimed at marginalised individuals and groups. The 
distribution of this type of property serves the social objective of enabling the 
                                        
34  Pienaar 2014 TSAR 428 mentions that access to land is important to establish social and economic 
stability in an everyday livelihood. 
35  A number of early laws made provision for greater access to land. The Distribution and Transfer 
of Certain State Land Act 119 of 1993 provided that state land could be transferred to a number 
of persons with the help of a commissioner and that no administrative fees, including registration 
fees, were due: ss 2, 4 and 15. The Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991 made 
provision for the enhanced designation of and establishment of townships, for less formal forms 
of residential settlement. The Act served as an expedited measure to facilitate urgent settlement 
needs in terms of which the developer of the land could allocate an erf on the land to a person for 
settlement, while the local authority owned the land (see specifically ss 3 and 8 of the Act). It is 
noteworthy that neither of these laws specifically regulated the occupation rights of the occupiers, 
which leads one to assume that they were in fact of an informal kind. The Land Reform: Provision 
of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993 goes one step further and adds that the developer of 
designated land for settlement purposes may sell or lease a piece of land to any person. In 
addition, the Minister may provide financial assistance to a prospective buyer or lessee. 
36  See for instance the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 and the Extension of Security of 
Tenure Act 62 of 1999. 
37  Carey Miller and Pope 2000 JAL 181. 
38  See specifically the Department of Land Affairs White Paper. 
39  Department of Land Affairs White Paper 4.3. It seems that the redistribution strategy is specifically 
aimed at beneficiaries that reside in rural areas. This is by no means accidental, since the Land 
Reform Pilot Programme that was released in October 1994 already stipulated that the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) identifies land reform as "the central and 
driving force of a rural development programme": Department of Land Affairs Land Reform Pilot 
Programme 1. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the redistribution strategy should find 
application only in rural areas. See specifically Viljoen (part 1) 2014 TSAR 362-367 for the 
argument that redistribution has an important role to play in both rural and urban areas. 
AJ VAN DER WALT & S VILJOEN    PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
1049 
previously dispossessed to have a space to live and to flourish as active participants 
in society.40  
An integral aspect of this strategy is the manner in which the property for this social 
objective should be obtained by the state and subsequently redistributed. The 
property clause explicitly stipulates that the public interest requirement for a valid 
expropriation includes the nation's commitment to redistribution,41 which conveys a 
clear message regarding the link between the extinction of specific extant property 
holdings and their transfer to land-reform beneficiaries under the auspices of the land-
reform commitment to redistributive justice. The institution of private property has a 
central role to play in both the political agenda of redistributive justice – in the sense 
of taking from those that have and giving to the have-nots – and the idealistic socio-
economic purpose it fulfills in redistributing wealth and ensuring stability for the sake 
of human flourishing. In this sense the institution of private property is viewed as a 
mechanism that can correct wrongs of the past. However, the mere acquisition of 
private property does not necessarily guarantee greater social welfare, since 
households' actual needs, seen in their proper context, might go well beyond the 
acquisition of private property.42  
                                        
40  This redistribution mandate was crafted against the backdrop of the entrenched notion of market-
based negotiation and settlement, which resulted in the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle: 
Pienaar 2014 TSAR 429. Also see Viljoen (Part 1) 2014 TSAR 360-362 for a discussion of this policy 
and the effects that it has had over a number of years. 
41  Section 25(4)(a) of the Constitution. Redistribution is essentially based on "willing buyer, willing 
seller" arrangements, while the role of the state is restricted to assisting the landless with the 
purchasing of land without being the purchaser or the owner. Instead, the state takes on an 
administrative role as the facilitator in land acquisitions – generally making land acquisition grants 
available and therefore financing the planning process: Department of Land Affairs White Paper 
4.3. Even though this approach might have had some success, it does not meet the target that 
the government has set for its redistribution strategy: Carey Miller and Pope 2000 JAL 182. 
42  Part of the ANC's initial housing policy was to introduce and develop a variety of tenure forms that 
would provide access to housing and grant secure tenure, but individual ownership has been the 
main form of tenure delivered in urban areas: Royston "Security of Urban Tenure" 176. Conversely, 
the 1994 White Paper on housing stated that "[o]ne of the most significant and short-term 
interventions required of the Government will be to provide the widest range of options for the 
rapid attainment of secure tenure": Department of Housing White Paper 3.2.2). The most complete 
form of such tenure is private ownership, which is why this is the main form of tenure delivered 
until now. The perception that ownership is the most important and valuable property right (as a 
right and a question of redress) has prevented a variety of tenure options from being developed 
and delivered in urban areas: Royston "Security of Urban Tenure" 176-177. It might seem that 
home ownership is the principal form of tenure for marginalised households, but ownership does 
not necessarily suit the needs of poor urban occupiers: Watson and McCarthy 1997 Habitat 
International 51-52. The authors state that globally, home ownership is not necessarily the best 
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The link between the provision of access to land and the broader land-reform objective 
of tenure security requires a purposive interpretation of the land-reform laws, going 
beyond the formalism of assuming that the current insecurity of tenure is simply a 
hangover of apartheid land law.43 Improved access to land would be incomplete and 
perhaps even futile unless it were accompanied by security of tenure. It is true that 
weak public-law occupation rights already characterised the apartheid era and that a 
lack of tenure security assisted the apartheid government in promoting its policies of 
spatial segregation and oppression,44 but that does not mean that newly created land 
rights would automatically be more secure – land-reform laws have to include positive 
steps to ensure tenure security. Tenure security enables individuals to live without 
fear of eviction and homelessness. It is central to the establishment of a place to live 
with a sense of stability where the individual can connect with her community and 
create societal relationships that are vital to the well-lived life – that is, a life lived with 
dignity.45 In this light, the constitutional mandate to promote tenure reform must be 
                                        
tenure option amongst poor urban dwellers. There is a preference among at least some of the 
urban poor to rent accommodation instead of acquiring ownership: Pienaar 2002 SAPL 361. More 
recently the legislature has introduced a greater variety of tenure forms, but these often lack 
legally secure tenure. See for instance a discussion of the social housing sector in Maass 2013 
SAJHR 585-587. Also see Pienaar 2014 TSAR 438, where she suggests that a rights-based 
approach is effective only if the context in which it must function is taken into consideration. A 
structured approach that is well supervised by the state is therefore crucial to the success of such 
an approach. 
43  Section 25(6) of the Constitution seems to suggest that there must be a direct link between 
occupiers' current insecurity and past racist laws. Nevertheless, it has generally been accepted 
that s 25(6) applies to all previously disadvantaged persons who currently occupy land with 
insecure tenure, because their tenure insecurity is either a direct or indirect consequence of the 
apartheid laws: Budlender "Constitutional Protection of Property Rights"; Alexander Global Debate 
291. 
44  The principle aim of the apartheid government was to segregate all the racial groups in South 
Africa and in order to give effect to this ideal it enacted a range of laws that affected the property 
rights, and specifically the land rights, of most racial groups, albeit unequally. During the apartheid 
era the legislature developed and extended a number of civil-law property principles to suit the 
needs of the affluent white minority who required new property law constructions and more secure 
property rights. Nevertheless, the civil-law tradition essentially remains scientifically neutral, 
objective and complacent: Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 203. In terms of apartheid laws, existing 
black owners and tenants were deprived of their private law rights, while the property rights that 
they were awarded in the public sphere could be defined as insecure lease rights: Van der Walt 
1995 SAJHR 187. 
45  The connection between poverty and tenure status is categorical, since tenure status is one of the 
core elements in the poverty cycle. Insecurity of tenure exacerbates poverty, which is why 
numerous governments have repeatedly responded to local housing shortages by implementing 
both welfare orientated housing policies that aim to make available affordable and secure housing 
options and legislation that will protect weak property/housing interests: Durand-Lasserve and 
Royston "International Trends" 7; Van der Walt "Housing Rights" 58. The importance of secure 
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interpreted widely and purposively to the extent that it should influence the rights 
associated with the provision of greater access to both land and housing.46 However, 
ensuring tenure security for both old and new land rights will very likely require the 
imposition of limitations on extant land holdings, at least to the extent that tenure 
security will detract from landowners' entitlement to dispose of their land and to 
exclude or evict non-owners. A holistic approach to the land reform provisions, the 
housing guarantee and the protective provisions of the property clause is therefore 
required. 
A number of pre-1994 and post-1994 laws have been enacted to give effect to the 
constitutional obligation to improve tenure reform,47 but the application of these laws 
is arguably limited since they seem to apply to current holders of land only.48 The laws 
                                        
tenure has also been reiterated in a number of contexts. In the international framework, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR) is an important 
international instrument to consider when considering the provision of land and housing, because 
a 11(1) of the ICESCR recognises a right to an adequate standard of living, including housing. The 
right to adequate housing as ensured in a 11(1) is defined in General Comment 4 of the ICESCR. 
In General Comment 4, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) states 
that the right to adequate housing should not be interpreted narrowly as merely a "roof over one's 
head", but that it should rather be seen as the right to occupy property with security: United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights The Right to Adequate Housing CESCR 
General Comment 4 UN Doc E/1992/23 (1991) para 7. Later in this paragraph the committee also 
refers to the Commission on Human Settlements and the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 
2000, where it was stated that adequate shelter includes adequate security. Also see United 
Nations Commission on Human Settlements Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 
A/RES/1988/181 (1988) for the Global Strategy for Shelter report. The CESCR also states that the 
"adequacy" of a housing condition depends on various factors, although there are "certain aspects 
of the right that must be taken into account … in any particular context": United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights The Right to Adequate Housing CESCR General Comment 
4 UN Doc E/1992/23 (1991) para 8. One of these aspects is the legal security of tenure, stipulated 
in para 8(a) of General Comment 4. This paragraph states that any type of tenure should ensure 
a degree of security of tenure.  
46  The way in which the mandate of tenure reform should essentially influence the delivery of housing 
options will be discussed in greater detail later in this article. 
47  For pre-1994 laws see for instance the Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership 
Act 81 of 1988 and the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. Both of these laws were 
essentially aimed at strengthening weak public-law rights by converting licences and permits into 
either ownership or some registered form of tenure. The state was empowered to upgrade the 
rights. The laws were not intended to extend to newly established occupation rights – that is 
occupation taken in terms of the new constitutional dispensation. For post-1994 laws see for 
instance the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 and the Land Reform 
(Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. 
48  Section 2(4) of the Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988 makes 
it clear that the Act targets existing holders of either licences, permits or other informal occupation 
rights, while s 2 of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991 is also phrased in a 
manner to suggest that the tenure rights, which it aims to upgrade to either leasehold or 
ownership, must have been granted in the past – that is, during the apartheid era. The Interim 
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are seemingly structured to provide legally secure tenure to previously disadvantaged 
groups who currently hold land with insecure tenure, which shows that the programme 
has a limited, backward-looking, restoration-type character.49 The importance of 
secure tenure raises the question of whether or not the programme can and should 
be extended beyond current land users to include future land holdings, which would 
have a direct impact on the content and status of new land rights awarded in line with 
section 25(5) and section 26(1) of the Constitution.50  
To summarise: the socio-economic right to housing and the land-reform objective of 
greater access to land are requisites for social welfare in the constitutional context, 
but these objectives may be empty if access to housing and land is provided on an ad 
hoc, informal basis that does not include secure tenure.51 A structured approach by 
the state is required both to eradicate extant forms of legally insecure tenure and to 
ensure that the socio-economically vulnerable are in future provided with secure land 
rights. The latter objective might involve the systemic optimisation of private property 
rights for either a specific person or a group of newly entitled individuals.52 One should 
                                        
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 is inherently limited to temporarily protect 
existing weak land rights. S 3 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 explicitly only 
provides tenure protection for persons who were labour tenants on 2 June 1995. A person who 
becomes a labour tenant after this period can in principle not claim the tenure protection that the 
Act provides for. 
49  Even though restorative justice is essentially aimed at historical redress, the land reform 
programme must be viewed as a mechanism also to indicate how new land holdings should look 
and how they should be different from the past. In this sense tenure security must be employed 
in future land holdings. Pienaar 2014 TSAR 437 also states that "… the material provisions aimed 
at tenure reform, redistribution and restitution were intrinsically restricted and short-sighted. The 
latter defect particularly embodied a lack of synergy with other connected and related issues that 
impacted on land generally. It furthermore lacked a constitutional foundation that was clearly 
needed to prevent anything slightly resembling apartheid from happening again". 
50  The provision of access to land/housing in urban areas without tenure security is dealt with later 
in this article. See specifically Pienaar 2014 TSAR 439-440 for existing problems with the 
redistribution programme, amongst others the shift of the target group from the poorest of the 
poor to more wealthy beneficiaries; the demand-led approach; and complexities regarding the 
grant system. Overall, there has also been more emphasis on the provision of leases, but the 
security of these leases has not been properly debated. 
51  See for instance Durand-Lasserve 2006 Global Urban Development 2-3 for an explanation 
regarding the global importance of secure tenure and how this objective fits in with a social-welfare 
commitment towards the eradication of poverty. 
52  There are a number of private property rights that could be granted for this purpose, namely 
ownership, limited real rights (including registered long-term leases or servitudes of either personal 
use or habitation) or personal rights that are statutorily protected.  
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not underestimate the power of the common law land-use rights,53 but at the same 
time one should not be hesitant to introduce new statutory rights that provide greater 
security than was traditionally associated with their common-law counterparts.54 The 
legislature has a wide discretion to promulgate and amend laws for this important 
social-welfare purpose.55 
The redistribution of land and the gradual strengthening of legally insecure tenure 
rights are social-welfare objectives that are crucial to the transformative purpose of 
the Constitution, which will in some instances result in extant property holdings being 
either limited or taken away from the haves and redistributed to the have-nots.56 In a 
                                        
53  The idea that private property rights can have presumptive power over public interests was 
developed by Underkuffler. She proposes a distinction between the common conception of 
property and the operative conception of property. According to the former, individual property 
interests, held by legal rights holders, are presumptively superior to competing public interests. 
Private property rights can be limited by the public interest, provided that the limitations are 
justified, since property rights have presumptive power: Underkuffler Idea of Property 44-46. In 
terms of the operative conception of property, change is considered an integral part of the very 
concept of property. Property rights therefore change according to and in line with general social 
needs: Underkuffler Idea of Property 48-49. Accordingly, the tensions that evolve between 
individual rights and society at large are part of the very meaning of property: Underkuffler Idea 
of Property 53-54. Underkuffler argues that "[i]t is the nature of the interests and the values that 
they assert – not the identities or numbers of the holders – that should determine normative (and 
presumptive) power": Underkuffler Idea of Property 97. The operative concept of property clearly 
makes more sense in a society that has a redistribution mandate, since extant property rights are 
affected throughout the process – change is already part of our concept of property, especially 
with regard to land. This does not mean that private property rights have no power. Our claim is 
not that private property has presumptive power (or that it should), but rather that private property 
doctrine can be utilised to provide beneficiaries of the land reform programme to hold secure 
property rights – this can be in the form of ownership, long-term leases etc.  
54  Regardless of the domination of ownership over other interests in land and its resistance against 
statutory intervention, "… governments routinely use (and have always used) legislation to amend 
or regulate the hierarchical domination of property ownership in response to social, economic and 
political circumstances and requirements. One significant example of such intervention is the 
embodiment of anti-eviction policies in legislation": Van der Walt Property in the Margins 78. The 
systemic strengthening of tenure rights for vulnerable individuals or groups is easily attainable 
through properly enacted laws. Previous landlord-tenant laws adopted in both South Africa and 
England show how the introduction of statutory tenancies has provided strong tenure protection 
for tenants during housing shortages. The ease with which the state can ensure immediate tenure 
protection becomes evident when considering these laws and the effect they have had over lengthy 
periods of time. See specifically Maass 2012 PELJ.  
55  See specifically ss 25(6), 25(8) and 25(9) of the Constitution.  
56  Section 25(2) of the Constitution allows the state to expropriate private property, provided that 
the expropriation is authorised in terms of law of general application, the expropriation is for a 
public purpose or in the public interest, and compensation is paid. The amount of compensation 
should essentially be influenced by the factors mentioned in s 25(3) of the Constitution, which 
should also result in an equitable balance being struck between the public interest and the interests 
of those affected. S 25(5) provides clear constitutional authority for land reform, including a 
mandate for the state to "… take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
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number of instances private property has been regulated for land-reform purposes in 
such a way that the social-welfare objective is prioritised and given effect to, after 
which the guarantee that nobody may be deprived of private property arbitrarily is 
considered – that is, if the latter question comes up at all.57 In the majority of 
redistribution and tenure-reform cases the constitutional protection of private property 
simply does not feature, because the land-reform objectives are clearly authorised in 
terms of legislation and are ostensibly non-arbitrary in the light of the overall 
significant social-welfare purpose they serve – the FNB arbitrariness test would simply 
show that there is sufficient reason for the limitations.58 Using the state's power of 
expropriation for land-reform objectives is also widely accepted as a justifiable state 
action that serves a valid public purpose, and provided that just and equitable 
compensation is paid this kind of expropriation should be constitutionally unassailable 
as a strategy to promote the access-to-land and access-to-housing objectives.59  
                                        
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis". 
It is therefore clear that the Bill of Rights gives priority to the land reform programme and any 
measure that is either intended to give effect to the equitable redistribution of land or aimed at 
redressing past injustices should in principle be regarded as important and given the appropriate 
priority: Van Wyk 2005 Stell LR 473-474. In 2006 the Minister of Land Affairs acknowledged the 
slow progress of land reform and it was indicated that two million hectares of land had to be 
redistributed annually to meet its 24.6 million hectares target by 2014. The Minister of Public Works 
has also indicated that expropriations should be used to accelerate land reform in a just manner: 
Pienaar, Du Plessis and Olivier 2007 SAPL. Nevertheless, the slow rate of the redistribution 
programme has led to calls for a more far-reaching approach in terms of which land owned by the 
white minority should be more rapidly distributed to the black majority. It seems that the 
government is considering a number of mechanisms to increase the redistribution of land, including 
expropriation, a land tax, a restriction on the ownership of land and the purchasing of private land: 
Pienaar, Du Plessis and Olivier 2006 SAPL 199. In 2013, President Zuma confirmed in his State of 
the Nation address that the government will do away with the "willing buyer, willing seller" policy 
and revert to the "just and equitable" principle to determine compensation for expropriations: Sapa 
2013 http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Willing-buyer-seller-principle-to-go-20130214. 
57  See for instance the structure of the court's analysis in Nhlabathi v Fick 2003 7 BCLR 806 (LCC). 
Also see Pienaar, Du Plessis and Olivier 2012 SAPL for a complete survey of recent case law 
regarding land reform matters. It is striking to note the number of cases that deal with both the 
land restitution programme and evictions in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 
1997 (ESTA), which was initially promulgated to ensure better tenure protection for farm workers. 
Case law regarding evictions in terms of ESTA generally deals with the interpretation of the Act 
and the factual circumstances of the evictees' tenure. The limitation of the landowners' property 
rights is not dealt with since the justification for such limitation is simply not at issue. 
58  See for instance Khumalo v Potgieter 1999 ZALCC 68 (17 December 1999), where neither the 
purpose nor the effect of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 was disputed, despite 
the fact that it allows for the transfer of private property from a landowner to a labour tenant. The 
only issue in the case was the adequate amount of compensation that had to be paid to the 
landowner. 
59  See for instance Khumalo v Potgieter 1999 ZALCC 68 (17 December 1999). Limited cases have 
dealt with the state's power to expropriate land for redistribution and tenure reform purposes 
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Private ownership of land is inherently limited, especially in South African law, since 
the limits of ownership are defined by the social-welfare value of land and by the 
constitutional land-reform imperatives. The limitations imposed on ownership by the 
constitutional land-reform obligation are crucial to the beneficiaries' social citizenship. 
The social obligations of landowners find expression in the laws that give effect to the 
constitutional redistribution and tenure-reform objectives. The social-welfare purpose 
of these laws is clear and it is generally accepted that this purpose, embodied in the 
constitutional land-reform obligations, justifies expropriatory and regulatory state 
actions that will impose limitations on private ownership. In this sense, the section 25 
guarantee of property rights serves a subsidiary role since the land-reform objectives 
are prioritised in terms of the regulatory framework. The purpose and effect of the 
property guarantee in section 25 is not to insulate extant property holdings from state 
actions that will limit property for the sake of land-reform objectives, but to ensure 
that the limitations that are in fact imposed on extant property holdings in the process 
of promoting land-reform objectives are not arbitrary or disproportionate. To that 
extent, the systemic unity between property on the one hand and access-to-land and 
access-to-housing rights on the other consists of the proper space that each of these 
rights occupies in the single system of law under the Constitution: constitutionally 
mandated and authorised land rights and housing rights are not to be treated as ex 
post restrictions that are imposed on what is perceived as ex ante unrestricted 
ownership – and that must therefore be justified – but as discrete constitutional rights, 
just like property, that exist and need to be protected in terms of the overall 
democratic and constitutional principles that make up the system of law and society 
we choose to live in. 
  
                                        
simply because the state has not expropriated a significant number of properties for these 
purposes. The issue in case law that concerns expropriations for restitution purposes is usually the 
determination of the amount of compensation – landowners are simply not attacking the 
justification of this important restorative justice objective. See for instance the discussion in 
Pienaar, Du Plessis and Olivier 2012 SAPL for some idea of the issues raised in restitution case 
law. 
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4 Property and housing rights in the Constitution 
4.1 Introduction 
Some authors have argued that some property is necessary for persons to exercise 
their individual autonomy, since property provides a platform where self-realisation 
can take place, which arguably justifies the extension (redistribution) of property.60 
According to Alexander, the purpose of property law is to promote "human flourishing" 
for both owners and non-owners,61 since "[e]very person is entitled, as a matter of 
human dignity, to flourish".62 In addition, Alexander argues, "[t]he home is the central 
locus for developing and experiencing all, or nearly all, of the capabilities necessary 
for human flourishing".63 Peñalver explains that a person cannot flourish if she is 
denied some physical space where she can exercise essential activities.64 According to 
this theory, access to a home and the ability to occupy it for substantial periods of 
residential stability (tenure security) are therefore essential to human flourishing. 
                                        
60  Foster and Bonilla 2011-2012 Fordham L Rev. Prolific academic arguments have also been raised 
against the idea that the "home" deserves greater protection than other forms of property. Stern 
2008-2009 Mich L Rev argues that psychological primacy of the home is in fact misplaced since 
there is no empirical evidence that supports this theory. Empirical research rather shows that social 
relations are vital for human flourishing. At 1110 Stern argues that "contrary to claims in the 
property scholarship, the home is not a primary construct of self and identity, residential dislocation 
does not typically harm mental health, and the relationship between homeownership and self-
esteem is equivocal. Moreover, in contrast to the object focus of personhood theory, an enormous 
body of empirical work establishes that social interactions and ties – not possessions – are the 
bedrocks of psychological thriving". In addition, the idea that the on-going control of property is 
important for self-realisation is misconstrued since evidence shows that dynamism is in fact vital 
for self-growth and identity development. Relocation has been found to offer an opportunity for 
the development of new skills and the possibility of self-growth: Stern 2008-2009 Mich L Rev 1114. 
Schnably 1992-1993 Stan L Rev critiques the ideal of human flourishing – founded on society's 
consensual values – on the basis that there is no such consensus, specifically regarding the 
normative value attached to the home. Schnably argues that the home as a property interest does 
not deserve greater protection simply because it constitutes someone's home, since the normative 
values attached to the home are based on an assumed consensus that does not exist. The home 
is often also "a place of domination and resistance, conflict and discord, as it is the centre of a 
'healthy life'": Schnably 1992-1993 Stan L Rev 367. 
61  Peñalver 2008-2009 Cornell L Rev 828. 
62  Alexander and Peñalver 2009 Theo Inq L 140-141. On the other hand, Rose 1995-1996 Notre 
Dame L Rev 329-330 argues that despite libertarian arguments for property as essential for 
personal autonomy, property is generally perceived as an economic right since it generates wealth. 
This right is not central to the political core of the government, while political rights, such as the 
right to vote, are.  
63  Alexander 2009 Cornell L Rev 816. 
64  Peñalver 2008-2009 Cornell L Rev 880. Owners have an obligation to assist those without such a 
space. This would at least be the case if there were a general sense of obligation to promote 
human flourishing in society. 
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Radin also argues that in some circumstances an occupier's non-commercial personal 
use of her home carries more weight, on a moral basis, than the owner's commercial 
interest in reclaiming the property.65 "Personal" property is "bound up" with a person's 
personhood, because self-investment in the object has taken place.66 On the other 
hand, "fungible" property is held for purely commercial reasons and is exchangeable.67 
According to Radin's theory, there is an important connection between personal 
property and the individual, since this type of property not only contributes to the 
holder's self-development, but also enables her to participate in society as a fulfilled 
person. In the housing framework, the occupier's home68 is a form of personal 
property because of the occupier's self-investment in it. The preservation of this 
interest becomes "… a priority claim over curtailment of merely fungible interests of 
others".69 As a result, the residential occupiers' personal interest in a home 
necessitates more stringent legal protection than the landowner's interest, because 
personal property is deemed more important by social consensus.70  
The theoretical arguments raised by Alexander, Peñalver and Radin regarding the 
increased protection of "home" rights, on the basis that they are socially important 
because they enable the holder to flourish, do not resonate with the South African 
courts' approach to property and housing matters, at least not as far as the role of 
section 25 is concerned. It is simply not the purpose of the South African property 
clause to enable human beings to flourish – the clause simply protects holders of 
                                        
65  Radin 1986 Philosophy and Public Affairs 360. The function of property for both private landowners 
and tenants is similar in German landlord-tenant disputes. 
66  The notion of property's being bound up with the holder was initially introduced by Radin in an 
earlier article where she extensively analysed the relationship between property and personhood: 
Radin 1981-1982 Stan L Rev. At 959 the author argues that the strength of a person's relationship 
with a specific object could be measured by the pain that person would suffer once the object is 
lost. 
67  Radin 1986 Philosophy and Public Affairs 362. Personal property has a unique value for the specific 
individual and can therefore not be replaced with another object without incurring some moral loss 
for the person. "The notion that external objects can become bound up with personhood reflects 
a philosophical view of personhood." Radin also mentions that the distinction between personal 
and fungible property should actually function on a continuum, because self-investment in property 
is a matter of degree. The extent to which self-investment takes place also depends on the 
individual's subjective feelings: Radin 1986 Philosophy and Public Affairs 363. 
68  Also see Fox Conceptualising Home 25-27 for a similar argument. 
69  Radin 1986 Philosophy and Public Affairs 365.  
70  Radin 1981-1982 Stan L Rev 978-979. Radin refers to her theory as a non-utilitarian moral theory, 
because certain claims are better protected based on their moral value: Radin 1981-1982 Stan L 
Rev 985. 
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extant property interests against arbitrary state interference, which means that it is 
often considered subsidiary to more important constitutional (and even societal) 
rights, interests and considerations. This does not mean that the home interest is not 
important or that the Constitution does not recognise it, though. The South African 
Constitutional Court has held that "… human dignity, freedom and equality, the 
foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or 
shelter"71 and has generally established the principle that the courts have a duty to 
address situations of homelessness, because it goes "… to the core of a person's life 
and dignity".72 However, the home interest is not recognised or protected as a 
property interest. In this property context the courts have explicitly rejected the notion 
that the "home" deserves greater protection than other rights or societal values.73 A 
property interest will therefore not receive a heightened level of protection on the 
basis that it constitutes a person's home.  
While the home interest is not protected as a special kind of property, it is explicitly 
recognised and protected as part of the right to housing. The South African housing 
provision is essentially welfare-orientated in the sense that it is directed at the most 
vulnerable to ensure that they are not rendered homeless and that they are eventually 
provided with adequate housing. Of course, the protection of extant housing rights 
forms part of this social-welfare purpose, but insofar as the core housing right is 
shaped in the form of an access-to-housing right it is limited to the marginalised and 
it is not absolute. Furthermore, insofar as the housing right assumes the form of the 
right not to be evicted from an existing home it again finds its roots in the right of 
                                        
71  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 23. 
72  Sachs 2000 SMU L Rev 1388. 
73  In Lester v Ndlambe Municipality 2014 1 All SA 402 (SCA) para 17 the Court decided that s 26(3) 
of the Constitution must be interpreted against the backdrop of s 26(1). Evictees can therefore 
rely on protection in terms of s 26(3) only if they are socio-economically weak and might be 
rendered homeless as a result of the eviction order. As in Lester, the protection of one's home 
does not necessarily carry a greater value than other societal concerns, such as the state's duty 
to uphold the law and seek a demolition order in a case where building works are clearly illegal. 
Anything to the contrary would amount to an infringement of the legality principle and condone a 
criminal offence: Lester v Ndlambe Municipality 2014 1 All SA 402 (SCA) para 27. Even though the 
facts were vastly different, a similar outcome was reached in the recent case of Malan v City of 
Cape Town 2014 6 SA 315 (CC). The majority held that an elderly woman's home interest should 
not necessarily be prioritised as more important than a City's "zero-tolerance approach to drug 
dealing being conducted at any of its rental housing units": Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 6 SA 
315 (CC) para 57.  
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access to housing and not in the property clause. For the most part, this second aspect 
of the housing right will feature in a clash with property rights and not as a property 
right. These qualifications are integral to any dispute between sections 25 and 26. 
In constitutions that do not include a provision in the bill of rights that explicitly 
protects non-owner housing rights, it has become customary to protect the housing 
rights of non-owners via the general property clause. The best example is German 
law, where the Federal Constitutional Court has developed an extensive case law that 
recognises the protection of residential tenants particularly, whose housing rights are 
set out in legislation as property in terms of the general property clause in Article 14. 
Since World War II the German legislature has promulgated legislation to protect 
residential tenants against cancellation and eviction. In the case law dealing with this 
legislation, a central issue was to decide how closely the courts could scrutinise a 
landlord's reasons for cancelling a lease on the basis of requiring the property for her 
own use. In 1989 the Federal Constitutional Court recognised that tenant-protection 
laws place considerable limitations on the ownership of rental property but argued 
that an interpretation of these laws that takes no account of the landlord's wish to use 
her property for her own purposes would be in conflict with the constitutional 
guarantee of ownership in article 14 GG.74 In other words, the courts must exercise 
their discretion to decide whether the landlord's needs are reasonable with restraint, 
so as not to interfere with the owner's fundamental right to take responsibility for her 
own life. At the same time, the tenant is not without protection either; in 1993 the 
Court indicated that the mere declared intention of the landlord to use the property 
for her own purposes was insufficient to justify cancellation and that the courts must 
inquire whether that intention is reasonable and feasible. In the process, the Court 
(controversially) cast the rights of tenants as a constitutional property interest that 
can under certain conditions withstand the owner's property right.75 In other words, 
casting the housing rights of tenants (tenure security) as property was a necessary 
step in ensuring the constitutional status of those rights. 
                                        
74  BVerfGE 79, 292 (Eigenbedarfskündigung) 304-305.  
75  BVerfGE 89, 1 (Besitzrecht des Mieters) 9-10.  
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In South African law it is not necessary to promote social welfare in the form of either 
access to housing or the protection of existing housing rights via the property clause, 
since both those rights are protected explicitly in section 26 of the Constitution.76 We 
do not exclude the possibility that it might be necessary or strategically advantageous, 
in a particular case, to rely on section 25 to strengthen the access to housing rights 
of a particular group or person, but in principle doing so is unnecessary. Generally 
speaking, conflicts about housing rights should be decided in terms of section 26 (and 
legislation enacted in terms of it) and not in terms of section 25.77 When residential 
occupiers of land or tenants rely on section 26 for the protection of their housing 
rights, it is to be expected that the landowner might rely on section 25 to oppose their 
housing-right claims. That could of course create the same kind of binary confrontation 
between property (section 25) and social welfare (section 26) that we referred to 
earlier. It is therefore necessary, given a constitutional text that protects both property 
and housing rights explicitly, to sort out the relationship between section 25 rights and 
section 26 rights.  
4.2 The constitutional matrix: the Port Elizabeth Municipality decision  
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers78 the Constitutional Court explained 
the constitutional approach to conflicting land rights with reference to the historical 
context of discriminatory land law. The court noted that the process starts even before 
section 25 property rights are considered at all:  
                                        
76  The full text of s 26 of the Constitution: 
 Housing  
 26. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.  
 (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.  
 (3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of 
court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions. 
77  This is also in accordance with the subsidiarity principle developed in the case law of the 
Constitutional Court: a litigant who avers that a right protected by the Constitution has been 
infringed must rely on legislation specifically enacted to protect that right and may not rely on the 
constitutional provision directly when bringing action to protect the right. See South African 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52; Van der Walt 2008 
CCR 100-103; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36.  
78  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 8-23.  
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[T]he starting and ending point of the analysis [to interpret section 25] must be to 
affirm the values of human dignity, equality and freedom.79  
Section 25(1), protecting existing property rights against arbitrary deprivation, 
guarantees property against the arbitrary state deprivation that was the norm in racist 
apartheid laws, but at the same time the enforcement of privileged property rights 
was a core aspect of apartheid inequality and oppression, and therefore fundamental 
rights such as equality and human dignity must be secured before property rights are 
even considered.  
In the court's view, the Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning 
rights relating to property that were not previously recognised by the common law:  
[The Constitution] counterposes to the normal ownership rights of possession, use 
and occupation, a new and equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be deprived of a 
home. The expectations that normally go with title could clash head-on with the 
genuine despair of people in dire need of accommodation. The judicial function in 
these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement between the 
different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the rights 
of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather, 
it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible, 
taking account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each 
particular case.80 
This passage is a highly significant and useful statement of the Constitutional Court's 
view of the "constitutional matrix" within which constitutional and statutory provisions 
relating to property and housing rights have to be interpreted and within which the 
interpretation of legislation should take place. Firstly, the granting of an eviction order 
is no longer mechanically ensured by proof of the common law requirements – in line 
with section 26(3), an eviction order can be granted only if eviction is justifiable in 
view of all the circumstances. Secondly, the consideration of an eviction order in view 
of the circumstances amounts to a balancing exercise in which the rights of the 
landowner are considered against the interests of the occupiers, even when the latter's 
interests cannot be described as property rights in the traditional mould. Thirdly, this 
balancing exercise takes place against the background of the history of eviction in the 
apartheid era and its lasting and enduring effects on the distribution of land and access 
                                        
79  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 15. 
80  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
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to housing today. Furthermore, the contextualised approach presupposes that the 
personal circumstances of the evictees and the practical effect that an eviction order 
would have for them must be considered when deciding whether such an order would 
be justified. Within this matrix, property rights do not simply and abstractly trump 
weaker or no-right interests in property, as they were assumed to do in the logic of 
traditional property law. To that extent, Port Elizabeth Municipality indicates that the 
content and status of housing rights under the Constitution are not determined either 
from the vantage point of property or in direct opposition to property; instead, the 
constitutional analysis must assume the format of determining the proper space for 
each right in the single system of law created under the Constitution. The primary 
indicator of the space that housing rights occupy is section 26, not section 25. 
Following up on the decision in Port Elizabeth Municipality, conflicts between section 
26 housing rights and section 25 property rights should not be adjudicated as a 
hierarchical ordering of the two competing rights either, since the owner's property 
rights would generally trump housing interests in a traditional, hierarchical approach. 
According to the approach set out in Port Elizabeth Municipality, the new approach 
should be to "weigh up" the access-to-housing interests of the affected persons and 
the property rights of the landowner to establish what the effect on the former 
inhabitant would be if the right were terminated, and what the effect on the landowner 
would be if it were not terminated, in both cases taking into consideration the 
historical, social and individual context. Since infringements against access to housing 
rights and legal rules that bring about homelessness always involve the section 10 
right to human dignity, this weighing-up process has to take dignity into consideration 
as well.81 However, the equality and human dignity aspects that accompany eviction 
cases, especially if the evictees are members of a marginalised and under-privileged 
                                        
81  See Liebenberg Socio-economic Rights ch 6; Muller Impact of Section 26 75-93 and sources cited 
there. The most important cases cited by Muller are Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 23, 83; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 
140 (CC) para 29; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 12, 
15, 18, 41-42; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 16; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) paras 75, 119, 173, 218, 231, 329, 406; Machele v 
Mailula 2010 2 SA 257 (CC) para 29. Also see Chaskalson 2000 SAJHR; Sachs 2003 Current Legal 
Problems; and Liebenberg 2005 SAJHR. 
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group, generally require the section 26 rights to be considered first, before the section 
25 rights are decided.82 In view of the introductory remarks to this section, a utilitarian 
weighing-up of section 25 rights and section 26 interests might be just as undesirable 
as a libertarian confrontation between the two. If what appears to be the correct 
interpretation of the common law or of legislation would have the effect of rendering 
homeless someone who currently has or previously had access to housing, regardless 
of how inadequate that accommodation might have been and how unlawful or weak 
the access was, the resulting prima facie conflict with section 26(3) might be said to 
require a different approach that starts out with section 26 analysis and that will (if at 
all) proceed to section 25 analysis only once the section 26 rights have been secured.  
The Port Elizabeth Municipality decision indicates that the section 26(1) access to 
housing interest of even unlawful occupiers, who enjoy no rights in terms of the 
common law, is relevant to the weighing up process involved in a section 26 analysis. 
That implies that any weighing-up of their housing interests against the landowner's 
property right would be self-defeating. It is therefore possible that the contextual 
assessment of all rights and interests that the Port Elizabeth Municipality decision 
foresees, in view of the contextual and legislative matrix within which housing rights 
and obligations are regulated under the guidance of section 26 and the rest of the bill 
of rights, requires the section 26 analysis to be undertaken and completed first. The 
nature and purpose of a section 26 analysis would be to establish whether or not the 
infringement of section 26 access-to-housing or anti-eviction rights that would result 
from the proposed interpretation of the relevant common law or legislation would be 
justified, in view of section 36(1) of the Constitution, considering the matrix of 
constitutional and other legal provisions in the broad social and historical context 
sketched out in Port Elizabeth Municipality. If the infringement of section 26 rights 
implied by the proposed interpretation cannot be justified, it is unconstitutional and 
then a different interpretation, development of the common law or a statutory 
amendment might be required to ensure that the section 26 right is given effect to. 
Once an interpretation of the common law or an interpretation of the legislation has 
                                        
82  Van der Walt 2013 SALJ proposes a similar argument relating to the development of a common-
law principle in the area of the personal servitude of habitation. 
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been settled to avoid conflict with section 26, the relevant interpretation or 
development that secures the protection of the section 26 rights might involve an 
infringement of the landowner's section 25 rights, which might then require ex post 
section 25 analysis.  
According to the methodology for deciding section 25 disputes that was laid down in 
the FNB decision,83 section 25 analysis would generally focus on the question of 
whether the deprivation of property resulting from the enforcement of section 26 
rights was arbitrary in the sense that the deprivation is procedurally unfair84 or, 
substantively, if there is insufficient reason for it, judging from a complexity of 
contextual relationships.85 In FNB the Court identified the relationship between the 
means employed and the ends sought to be achieved; the relationship between the 
affected property holder and the property; the connection between the affected 
property holder and the reason for the deprivation; the extent of the deprivation; and 
the nature of the affected property as factors to be considered in this respect. Since 
decisions such as Port Elizabeth Municipality and others suggest very strongly that the 
procedurally fair enforcement of section 26 rights will generally not result in the 
arbitrary deprivation of property, the ex post section 25 analysis is generally not even 
required. 
4.3 The protection of housing rights in anti-eviction strategies  
Port Elizabeth Municipality is an interesting case that not only explains the historical 
and social context regarding conflicts between property and other land rights, but also 
establishes the possibility that unlawful occupiers can remain on private land against 
                                        
83  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). For a general 
discussion see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 194ff. 
84  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. Neither 
the FNB decision nor subsequent decisions explain what procedural arbitrariness entails. Logically, 
this category can refer only to deprivation brought about directly by legislation and not involving 
any administrative action; see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 264-270; Van der Walt 
2012 Stell LR.  
85  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100; see 
further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 245-264. 
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the will of the landowner, in exceptional instances even for an indefinite period of 
time.86 In the light of the specific circumstances of the case, the Court sanctioned the 
continued unlawful occupation of the land and the concomitant deprivation of the 
landowner's property.87 In this case the deprivation was justified on the basis of the 
length of the prior occupation; the fact that neither the Municipality nor the owner 
required the land for any specific use; the Municipality's failure to engage with the 
occupiers; and the small size of the group, who also appeared to be genuinely in 
need.88 The factual analysis turned on the position of the occupiers and their 
constitutional needs, which really pushed the effect of the protection of the section 26 
right on the landowner's property into the background.89 In the end the Court 
therefore refrained from undertaking a proper section 25 analysis as had been 
foreseen in FNB.90  
A similar outcome was reached in Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,91 where 
a private landowner had obtained an eviction order against thousands of unlawful 
occupiers, which was essentially unenforceable because of the number of occupiers 
that would have had to be evicted.92 The court acknowledged both the occupiers' 
section 26 right of access to adequate housing and the section 25 right of the 
                                        
86  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 59-61. 
87  The owner was effectively deprived of his right to use and dispose of his property. In fact, the 
owner had no prospect of evicting the occupiers, absent the state's involvement in finding suitable 
alternative accommodation for the evictees. The Court made no order in this regard and one would 
have to assume that the state would had no further incentive to assist the owner and relocate the 
occupiers to more apt housing. In consequence the owner would probably be stuck with having a 
number of unlawful occupiers on his land for an indeterminate period of time, while the state 
escaped its duty in terms of s 26(2). 
88  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 59. 
89  See specifically Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 24-59. 
90  The purpose of this article is not to investigate whether the deprivation might have amounted to 
an arbitrary deprivation of property, but rather to show that the protection of the right to housing 
was prioritised. The protection of private property is therefore subsidiary and can therefore 
probably be infringed upon if the FNB analysis is not properly conducted by the courts. 
91  Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa 
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA). 
92  Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa 
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) paras 7 and 9. A deposit of R1.8m was 
required to cover the costs of a firm which the sheriff intended to engage to assist with the 
execution of the eviction order. This amount was higher than the value of the land unlawfully 
occupied (para 4). 
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landowner not to be deprived of property in an arbitrary manner and held that both 
rights had been infringed by the state's failure to ensure that alternative land was 
available to the unlawful occupiers.93 The Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the 
occupiers could remain on the land until alternative land was made available by the 
state. The only appropriate relief for Modderklip, who had to endure the prolonged 
and possibly indeterminate presence of the occupiers on its land while alternative land 
was found, was constitutional damages, based on the fact that Modderklip's private 
property rights had been infringed because it could not enforce its eviction order.94 
The basis for the compensation award was explained differently in the Constitutional 
Court, namely that the state's failure to act justified the payment of compensation.95 
As in Port Elizabeth Municipality, a proper section 25 analysis was not undertaken to 
determine whether the continued unlawful occupation of land would amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property.96 In the Supreme Court of Appeal the Court indirectly 
assumed that it did, while the Constitutional Court made no such finding.97 However, 
the fact that it was impossible in practice to relocate the unlawful occupiers had the 
effect that Modderklip was effectively deprived of its land to the extent that it could 
neither use it nor dispose of it.98 It could perhaps be argued that the result of not 
enforcing the eviction order in this case was a complete transfer of property, justified 
by the social-welfare purpose of protecting a vulnerable group against eviction, 
relocation and possible homelessness, in return for which the landowner was 
                                        
93  Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa 
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) paras 35 and 52. The Court construed 
the failure to protect and give effect to the occupiers' s 26 right as a direct consequence of the 
failure to protect Modderklip's s 25 right: Van der Walt 2005 SAJHR 159. 
94  Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa 
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 43. 
95  President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
48. The Constitutional Court focused on the s 34 right of access to the courts (with sufficient 
enforcement procedures) rather than the infringement of ss 25 and 26 as justification for the 
payment of compensation: Van der Walt 2005 SAJHR 156. 
96  See specifically Strydom and Viljoen 2014 PELJ for the argument that the deprivation in Modderklip 
was probably arbitrary. 
97  The Court decided that it was unnecessary to deal with the question of whether Modderklip's s 25 
right was infringed: President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 
5 SA 3 (CC) para 26. 
98  The state was also not interested in purchasing the property, despite the fact that the landowner 
was willing to part with it: Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 37. 
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compensated. However, this is not what either the Supreme Court of Appeal or the 
Constitutional Court saw as the justification for depriving Modderklip of its land.  
Subsequent Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court cases addressed the 
issue of the continued unlawful occupation of private land from the perspective that 
suspended eviction orders should be granted to allow the state to provide marginalised 
occupiers with suitable alternative accommodation if the eviction was likely to render 
them homeless.99 This development is directed only at households that are unable to 
acquire alternative accommodation because of their socio-economic vulnerability. 
Evictees who can acquire low-cost housing will therefore not be accommodated on 
the basis of this principle, which shows that it serves as a "safety net" for the poorest 
of the poor. The notion of suspended eviction orders is a welcome innovation for 
private landowners, since it indicates that unlawful occupiers will eventually be 
evicted.100 Private landowners are simply required to tolerate the presence of the 
                                        
99  In Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W), the court 
held for the first time that the interests of the occupiers, the private landowner and the state would 
be protected if the state was joined, because the state has a duty to provide the evicted occupiers 
with adequate housing: Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 
666 (W) para 18. The development of suspended eviction orders was held to be justifiable since 
it would generally not be just and equitable, and would therefore in contravention of ss 4(6) and 
4(7) of PIE, to grant an eviction order where the effect would be to render the occupiers homeless: 
The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele 2010 9 BCLR 911 
(SCA) paras 14, 16 and 18. In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC), the Constitutional Court decided that regardless of 
who the evictor is, once the possibility of homelessness exists as a result of an eviction order the 
situation can be categorised as an emergency and the state should provide emergency 
accommodation: City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 92. See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 
6 SA 417 (SCA) para 46 for a contradictory statement by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Court 
in City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) emphasised that the 
need to housing can be defined as an emergency if the occupiers would be rendered homeless in 
consequence of the eviction order (para 15). The s 26 obligations of the government are, however, 
not linked with the initial question of whether or not the eviction order would be just and equitable. 
The needs of the occupiers, and specifically the availability of alternative accommodation, can have 
an influence on the date of the eviction order, but will weigh very little when considering whether 
the eviction order should be granted or not. The Court decided that the eviction should be carried 
out without delay and that the City should provide temporary alternative accommodation to the 
evictees on the sheriff's schedule: City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 
294 (SCA) paras 14, 18 and 56-58. 
100  See specifically City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 40, where the Constitutional Court made it clear that "[i]t could 
reasonably be expected that when land is purchased for commercial purposes the owner, who is 
aware of the presence of occupiers over a long time, must consider the possibility of having to 
endure the occupation for some time. Of course a property owner cannot be expected to provide 
free housing for the homeless on its property for an indefinite period. But in certain circumstances 
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occupiers for a limited period of time while the state finds suitable alternative 
accommodation for the evictees.101 It seems that the courts now implicitly accept that 
any deprivation of the landowner's property that goes beyond a temporary delay in 
executing the eviction order will be unjustifiable since the obligation to provide housing 
to the socio-economically weak rests on the state,102 while private owners' property 
entitlements should generally not be limited to a greater extent than is necessary for 
the state to fulfill its obligations.103  
                                        
an owner may have to be somewhat patient, and accept that the right to occupation may be 
temporarily restricted, as Blue Moonlight's situation in this case has already illustrated. An owner's 
right to use and enjoy property at common law can be limited in the process of the justice and 
equity enquiry mandated by PIE". 
101  S 26(2) of the Constitution states that it is the obligation of the state to give effect to s 26(1) of 
the Constitution. The obligation of the state is interpreted narrowly to mean that the local authority 
should make alternative emergency housing available on an interim basis. In addition, the 
landowner's identity, previous use of the property, future plans with regard to the property and 
relationship with the occupiers are irrelevant, because the courts will disregard these factors when 
there is an emergency situation and place the obligation to prevent an increase in homelessness 
squarely on the local authority. In City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 
294 (SCA) it was decided that the question of whether alternative accommodation should be made 
available must be distinguished from the question of whether it would be just and equitable to 
grant the eviction order. The question concerning the justification of the eviction order must be 
separated from the obligation to provide housing, because these matters have implications for 
different role-players. 
102  In Blue Moonlight, the Court emphasised that in some instances, especially where the owner was 
aware of the presence of unlawful occupiers when it bought the building, private landowners might 
have to tolerate the temporary presence of such occupiers, but this does not mean that owners 
should provide free housing for an indefinite period: City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 34, 35 and 39-40. This was 
decided without any real engagement with the social obligations of the landowner as enacted in s 
25 of the Constitution. In Changing Tides the court decided that private owners might in some 
instances have to be patient when their usual ownership entitlements, including the right to use 
and dispose, are restricted temporarily to accommodate the pressing needs of the occupiers. The 
needs of the occupiers can have an influence on the date of the eviction order, but not the question 
of whether the eviction order should be granted or not: City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) para 18. 
103  This judicial development is not in line with the dictum of Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality, 
namely that "the Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to 
property not previously recognised by the common law. It counterposes to the normal ownership 
rights of possession, use and occupation, a new and equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be 
deprived of a home … The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical 
arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical 
way the rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather 
it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account 
of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case": Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23. The general decision that the 
occupiers should be evicted and relocated is also in conflict with the decision in Jaftha v Schoeman; 
Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) that any measure which deprives an occupier of existing 
access to housing limits the s 26(1) right. It follows that such an approach should generally not 
be followed by the courts. 
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The judicial development of a general duty to tolerate a delay in the execution of an 
eviction order, justified by state protection of the housing rights of vulnerable 
individuals and groups in terms of the state's duty to address homelessness, has now 
progressed to the point where it is generally accepted that the resulting interim 
deprivation of landowners' entitlement to use their land is a non-arbitrary deprivation 
of property, even without indulging in the case-by-case FNB-type analysis that one 
might expect.104 An argument that such a deprivation is arbitrary has simply not been 
raised since it is most unlikely to succeed in the majority of cases.105 The approach of 
the courts has been to prioritise the struggle against increased homelessness and the 
provision of access to housing, while the effect of these constitutional obligations on 
private landowners' property rights is generally so obviously constitutionally justified 
that an actual ex post section 25(1) analysis might be avoided in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances. At least in the anti-eviction context, the protection of 
private property is clearly a subsidiary constitutional consideration in eviction cases 
that deal with the housing needs of the poorest of the poor.106 The priority is to ensure 
that nobody is evicted from her home arbitrarily; once that objective has been secured 
the role of the property guarantee is merely to ensure that the ensuing deprivation of 
affected landowners' property was not arbitrary either. 
                                        
104  See specifically City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 40. 
105  A temporary deprivation of landowners' entitlement to use is most likely non-arbitrary in 
consideration of the socio-economic importance of the deprivation, namely to enable the state to 
find suitable alternative accommodation, and the factors listed in FNB, which require that there 
must be a relationship between the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved (a 
temporary restriction of the owner's use right to allow the state to find suitable alternative 
accommodation); the relationship between the affected property holder and the property (the 
majority of cases concerned private landowners of inner-city buildings that were unlawfully 
occupied); the connection between the affected property holder and the reason for the deprivation 
(private owners of inner-city buildings nowadays face the possibility that they might have to 
tolerate unlawful occupiers for interim periods of time, especially if they bought low-cost buildings 
that were already being unlawfully occupied); the extent of the deprivation; and the nature of the 
affected property.  
106  See for instance City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 37, 97 and 100, where the Court considered the landowner's 
property rights from the viewpoint of the occupiers' right to housing. The Court basically concluded 
that ownership can be limited in order to give effect to other constitutional rights, provided that 
the deprivation is both authorised in terms of law of general application and is non-arbitrary. The 
exact impact of the deprivation and a contextual analysis thereof was simply not scrutinised.  
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Even though the eviction jurisprudence generally allows interim deprivations of 
property for the purposes of section 26, these interferences with private property 
occur on an ad hoc basis in consequence of households' pure desperation. 
Deprivations of this kind are authorised in terms of the anti-eviction procedures set 
out in PIE, which is intended to ensure that the evictions are non-arbitrary and 
therefore carried out in a just and equitable manner.107 These interferences with 
private property are therefore not planned as part of a structured state approach to 
the housing crisis – they simply occur along the way as a consequence of efforts to 
curb homelessness.  
4.4 Further support for housing rights in section 25 
The effect of the argument in this part of the paper is that access-to-housing rights 
and the protection of existing housing rights generally depend on section 26, further 
bolstered by section 10, and not section 25. In the preceding sections we argued one 
half of that main point, namely that associating housing rights (both in the form of 
tenure security and anti-eviction strategies) with section 26 rather than section 25 
does not mean that extant property holdings are insulated against the promotion and 
protection of housing rights. We argued, with reference to the constitutional text and 
case law, that section 26, further bolstered by other rights such as dignity, is a strong 
constitutional foundation for the promotion of housing rights and that it is not 
hampered by any perceived structural or hierarchical weakness vis-à-vis property. 
In this section, we want to comment on the second part of the argument, namely that 
the inclusion of an explicit housing right in the bill of rights means that the promotion 
and protection of housing rights do not depend on the constitutional property 
guarantee. Of course, this does not mean that section 25 cannot be utilised by the 
state or by parties in a strategic manner to strengthen housing rights. Our argument 
is aimed at a broader constitutional point, namely that section 26 should be seen and 
                                        
107  See specifically City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 37, where the Court stated that "[u]nlawful occupation results in a 
deprivation of property under s 25(1). Deprivation might however pass constitutional muster by 
virtue of being mandated by law of general application and if not arbitrary. Therefore PIE allows 
for eviction of unlawful occupiers only when it is just and equitable". 
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developed as the primary constitutional foundation of housing rights. It is true that in 
certain cases, depending on the circumstances of the landowner and the occupiers, 
private landowners might be obliged to carry a burden that goes some way towards 
providing non-owners with what very much looks like property rights. However, the 
role of the courts in this regard is limited, since they can suspend or refuse eviction 
orders, but they are generally not empowered to create legally secure tenure rights 
for unlawful occupiers beyond the structures that are foreseen in the applicable 
legislation. There is simply no statutory authorisation for the courts to create, alter or 
strengthen marginalised occupiers' tenure status of their own volition. It is the duty 
of the state to accommodate unlawful occupiers on a permanent basis, and it is the 
state that has the power to legislate and implement programmes to that effect. To 
that extent, we argue that there is very limited reason or scope, if any, for promoting 
or strengthening housing rights via the property framework of section 25. 
Having said that, it is true that several subsections of section 25 provide the state with 
the duty and the authority to make and implement laws that will directly or indirectly 
promote or strengthen housing rights. We provide several examples in the paragraphs 
that follow. However, the fact that these strategies are anchored in section 25 and 
that they promote housing rights does not have any bearing on our central argument, 
since the strategies involved arise from the land-reform subsections of the property 
clause (section 25(4)-(9)) as opposed to the property-securing subsections (section 
25(1)-(3)). The examples below therefore do not undermine our argument that 
housing rights are primarily rooted and should be promoted and protected on the basis 
of section 26. They merely demonstrate the broader fact that the housing right in 
section 26 finds further support in the land-reform provisions in section 25(4)-(9). 
One of the ways in which the state can intervene and ensure permanent housing 
solutions for the vulnerable on the basis of section 25 strategies is through its power 
to expropriate property. The power to expropriate is of course anchored in section 
25(2), but for the present purposes the crucial link is the use of that power for land-
reform and housing purposes as set out in section 25(4)-(9). Municipalities are, for 
instance, statutorily authorised to expropriate property for housing purposes, in line 
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with the state's redistribution mandate.108 Consequently, the state can compulsorily 
acquire property as a landowner and use it to provide accommodation (even to 
previously unlawful occupiers). The occupiers' tenure of the land would thereby 
effectively be transformed from unlawful and insecure occupation to lawful and secure 
rights.109 Moreover, in a case where a large number of unlawful occupiers reside on 
private land (or even in a privately-owned building) the power of expropriation could 
be used to circumvent the eviction and relocation of those occupiers and allow them 
to continue occupying their homes, albeit with legally secure tenure.110 Such an 
approach would avoid the grave disruptions, high costs and time-consuming processes 
of finding suitable alternative accommodation. A housing strategy of this nature is 
directly authorised by section 25, which sets out both the constitutional authority and 
requirements for expropriation (section 25(2)-(3)) and the obligation to provide 
equitable access to land (section 25(5)). 
In the alternative, the state can accommodate the homeless in emergency situations 
by using its power of expropriation to temporarily expropriate landowners' use rights, 
since such a temporary expropriation might be more cost-effective and less 
cumbersome than expropriating the land permanently.111 A variety of different types 
                                        
108  The Housing Act 107 of 1997 makes provision for a municipality to expropriate land by notice in 
the Provincial Gazette if it is required for the purposes of a housing development. S 9(3) requires 
that the state must a) be unable to purchase the land from the owner after reasonable 
negotiations; b) have obtained permission from the MEC before placing the notice in the Provincial 
Gazette; and c) publish a notice within six months after the MEC granted permission. S 25 also 
requires that expropriations must be in the public interest and that just compensation should be 
paid. Both the state's redistribution programme, which falls under the wider umbrella of the 
constitutional commitment to land reform, and the progressive provision of access to adequate 
housing – included in the Bill of Rights as a socio-economic right – are undoubtedly in the public 
interest: Viljoen (Part 1) 2014 TSAR 360-362. Also see s 6 of the Housing Development Agency 
Act 23 of 2008, in terms of which the Minister may expropriate land for the development of human 
settlements. 
109  An option for the state would therefore be to expropriate the property and thereafter transfer it to 
a Social Housing Institution which would be able to manage the property and make rental housing 
options available to the previously unlawful occupiers. Accordingly, the occupiers' tenure status 
would be transformed from being unlawful to being legally secure, provided that the rental 
agreements ensure secure tenure. For more detail on the state's social housing initiative see Maass 
2013 SAJHR. 
110  An outright expropriation of property would evidently have been a logical choice in a case such as 
Modderklip, where the eviction of thousands of unlawful occupiers was impossible.  
111  The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 generally empowers the Minister of Public Works to "… 
expropriate any property for public purposes or take the right to use temporarily any property for 
public purposes." S 12 of the Act, which regulates the basis on which compensation should be 
determined, makes a distinction between the expropriation of an owner's property and the taking 
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of property can be identified and put to use for this purpose, including vacant inner-
city buildings that are either habitable or in need of very little repair; already unlawfully 
occupied land or buildings; and portions of newly developed residential properties that 
are well-located in the inner cities.112 Expropriations of this kind can provide much-
needed tenure security to the beneficiaries, even if the accommodation is provided on 
a temporary basis, while it is established whether the property is suitable for a 
permanent solution or whether more suitable alternative land is available. Again, 
section 25(2)-(3) and 25(5) provides the framework that justifies and authorises this 
strategy. Unfortunately, the possibility of using the state's power of expropriation to 
create temporary (or even permanent) access to land and housing for the socio-
economically weak has not received the consideration one might expect. The 
important connection between sections 25(2)-(4) and 25(5) and between sections 
25(2)-(4) and 26(1)-(2) has simply not yet been analysed by the state to create 
pragmatic solutions to the housing crisis, despite the fact that existing expropriation 
and housing legislation makes provision for a number of ways in which the state can 
go about its obligations to provide greater access to land and housing. 
5 Conclusions 
Overall, the constitutional obligation to provide more equitable access to land and 
housing and to protect housing rights against arbitrary termination should enjoy more 
theoretical and doctrinal attention from property scholars and the state must also be 
more proactive in the development of these rights as discrete constitutional categories. 
In Port Elizabeth Municipality Sachs J noted the following:  
The Constitution recognises that land rights and the right of access to housing … are 
closely intertwined. The stronger the right to land, the greater the prospect of a 
secure home.113  
                                        
of a right to use property. In the case of the latter, the amount of compensation for the 
expropriation shall not exceed "… an amount to make good any actual financial loss caused by the 
expropriation or the taking of the right". See specifically Viljoen (Part 1) 2014 TSAR 366-367, 371-
376; Viljoen (Part 2) 2014 TSAR 528-533. 
112  Viljoen (Part 1) 2014 TSAR 367. 
113  However, one should acknowledge that the s 26(1) right includes an obligation on the state, in 
terms of s 26(2), to also make provision for services, including water and sewage: Van Wyk 2005 
Stell LR 469. This right might therefore seem to be more extensive than the s 25(5) right, although 
it is unlikely that the beneficiary in terms of the redistribution programme would be denied these 
services.  
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The intersection between sections 25 and 26 allows the state to negotiate the space 
between land rights and socio-economic rights progressively so as to satisfy both. 
These provisions cannot be interpreted in isolation; they are interdependent and 
interrelated.114 In addition, the provision of legally secure tenure must be incorporated 
as part of the realisation of these rights. The important connections between sections 
25(5) and 25(6) and between sections 26(1) and 25(6) must be considered as part of 
the constitutional matrix that regulates the relationship between property and housing 
rights, and this matrix should be reflected in housing policies and strategies.115 A 
number of laws have been enacted to give effect to the right to housing, but the 
legislature's failure to appreciate the importance of secure tenure for different rights 
holders is not in conformity with the transformative purpose of the Constitution and 
specifically section 25(6) of the Constitution.116 
                                        
114  Van Wyk 2005 Stell LR 475. 
115  In Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Scholtz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 28 the Court held that 
"[s]ection 26 must be seen as making that decisive break from the past. It emphasises the 
importance of adequate housing and in particular security of tenure in our new constitutional 
democracy". Also see the definition of "housing development" in s 1 of the Housing Act 107 of 
1997. Also see s 10A for a general restriction on the voluntary sale of state-subsidised housing. 
116  For example, enhanced tenure security has not been prioritised in the private landlord-tenant 
market, despite the fact that low-income households rent dwellings in informal settlements: 
Tissington Resource Guide to Housing 38. Roughly 55 per cent of tenants earn less than R3 500 
per month. It is safe to assume that tenants in informal settlements would be short-term tenants, 
since it would be basically impossible for these tenants to have their leases registered. See 
specifically Van der Walt and Maass (Part 1) 2012 TSAR and Van der Walt and Maass (Part 2) 2012 
TSAR for the argument that short-term tenants' rights are mainly personal and the registration 
thereof is necessary in order to convert them into real rights. Ch 3 of the Rental Housing Act 50 
of 1999 regulates the relationship between the parties and to some extent codified a number of 
common law rules. Some notable changes that were introduced by the Act are the general 
prohibition against discrimination and the requirement that the landlord may terminate the lease 
only on a ground that does not constitute an unfair practice: s 4 of the Act. The latter provision 
has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court to provide enhanced tenure protection for tenants. 
See specifically Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) and Maass 
2012 SAPL. In relation to the landlord's maintenance responsibility as well as his freedom to set 
rents, the Act is silent. On the other hand, the primary tenure option in the social housing sector 
is rental housing, while collective forms of ownership serve as alternative tenure options: 
Department of Human Settlements Social Housing Policy for South Africa Towards an enabling 
environment for social housing development (May 2005) 18. S 2(1)(h) of the Social Housing Act 
16 of 2008 states that government and Social Housing Institutions must ensure secure tenure for 
residents in social housing stock. The extent of tenure protection for social housing tenants is 
based on the provisions in the Housing Act and the Rental Housing Act: Department of Human 
Settlements Social Housing Policy 25, 81. The level of tenure protection will therefore be similar 
to that of private tenants in the private rental market, which is unsettling since the private sector 
does not generally make provision for strong tenure rights for tenants: Maass 2011 Stell LR 764. 
The overall aim of the social housing initiative, which is to provide affordable, secure rental housing 
options for low to medium income households, would be frustrated if tenants occupied units with 
insecure tenure. Social landlords are at liberty, for instance, to negotiate periodic tenancies that 
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It is generally accepted that the temporary or permanent transfer of natural resources 
in the form of land or residential premises must be undertaken by the state to 
gradually give effect to its redistribution and housing mandates. The state's power to 
either deprive landowners of some entitlements or expropriate the property as a whole 
(or to expropriate specific entitlements, even temporarily) should be utilised more 
creatively for these constitutional purposes, in conformity with the statutory guidelines 
already captured in a number of laws that have been promulgated under the auspices 
of these constitutional provisions. It is crucial that they are read together with due 
consideration of their social-welfare objectives.  
However, one must also be sensitive to the specific purposes that the different 
constitutional provisions serve. In the light of the divergent purposes of the property 
provision and the housing provision, it would be illogical to protect unlawful occupiers' 
housing interests, specifically against evictions, primarily as constitutional property 
rights in terms of section 25(1), since the housing provision (together with PIE) was 
specifically crafted for this purpose.117 Objections against eviction and homelessness 
usually come from the socio-economically weak and marginalized, who generally lack 
substantive property rights. The negative right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one's 
home addresses the issue of increased homelessness, and the courts have recently 
interpreted this right in line with the section 26(2) obligation of the state to provide 
alternative accommodation. It is highly unlikely that unlawful occupiers would gain 
any additional protection if they argue that their negative right not to be arbitrarily 
evicted should also be acknowledged as constitutional property and protected as such. 
Their anti-eviction right is explicitly protected in section 26(3) and in PIE, which might 
                                        
offer insubstantial tenure protection for tenants. These tenancies can be terminated on written 
notice by either party without having to acquire the permission of the other party or any outside 
authority: Cooper Landlord and Tenant 61-65. The social housing framework therefore fails to 
properly prescribe how social tenants will be enabled to occupy social housing on a continuous 
basis and consequently establish a home. 
117  See Viljoen 2014 CILSA for a similar argument specifically in relation to the protection of tenants' 
housing interests. It is argued that there is no need to protect tenants' interests as constitutional 
property, provided that there is a Bill of Rights that contains a housing clause. Tenants' interests 
are in such instances protected in terms of the housing clause rather than in the property clause. 
On the other hand, an incomplete Bill of Rights that does not contain a housing clause might have 
the effect that tenants' interests must be protected in terms of the property clause if they are to 
find any constitutional protection. 
AJ VAN DER WALT & S VILJOEN    PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
1076 
be countered by the landowner's argument that his property should not be limited in 
an arbitrary manner. From a subsidiarity point of view the alternative, in terms of 
which the concept of property should be extended to also protect unlawful occupiers, 
would simply be irrational.118 It would also cast a conflict between landowners and 
unlawful occupiers or the homeless in the shape of a property-vs-property contest, 
which is most likely to be adjudicated on the basis of the hierarchical vocabulary and 
doctrine of property law to the detriment of the occupiers. In that sense the decision 
in Port Elizabeth Municipality could be seen as a warning not to cast eviction and 
homelessness cases in a purely property-vs-property mould; in other words not to 
adjudicate them purely on the basis of section 25, but to rather ensure protection for 
the occupiers solely on the basis of sections 10 and 26.  
Nevertheless, once property has been redistributed or transferred for housing 
purposes and the beneficiaries have acquired either statutory or private-law property 
rights in these resources, the new holders of these rights should be able to protect 
their interests as constitutional property against arbitrary state interferences. There is 
no general constitutional guarantee in terms of section 26 that all extant housing 
interests deserve some special protection against either the state or private parties.119 
                                        
118  In terms of the subsidiarity principle, as it was developed by the Constitutional Court, a litigant 
must first rely on legislation that was promulgated with the aim of giving effect to a constitutional 
right if that person wishes to enforce that right: Van der Walt 2008 CCR 100. This principle was 
developed in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 
51-52. In such a case the litigant may not rely directly on the constitutional provision, except 
where the constitutional validity of the legislation is challenged: Van der Walt 2008 CCR 101, 
referring to South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) para 
52; Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 437; Sidumo v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) para 248; Engelbrecht v Road Accident Fund 
2007 6 SA 96 (CC) para 15. It would clearly be at odds with the subsidiarity principle if an unlawful 
occupier challenged an eviction on the basis of s 25(1) of the Constitution. S 26(3) of the 
Constitution was specifically included to protect evictees and ensure that evictions are carried out 
in a just and equitable manner, while PIE was enacted to give effect to s 26(3). 
119  Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has confirmed that the housing provision places at least a 
negative obligation on the state (and on all other entities and individuals) to desist from action 
that would impair the right of access to adequate housing. The Court held that "… any measure 
which permits a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing, limits the rights 
protected in s 26(1)": Jaftha v Scoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 34. The 
state should be allowed to interfere with an individual's access to housing only when it is justifiable 
to do so: Jaftha v Scoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) paras 26, 28. Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 361-362 argues that from the decision one can infer that any 
legislation or action, by an individual or state body, that impairs indigent peoples' existing housing 
rights is perceived as a limitation on the negative obligation provided for in s 26(1) of the 
Constitution. Also see Liebenberg 2008 TSAR 467 on the negative obligation as developed in the 
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The protection and concomitant state duty in terms of section 26 is welfare-oriented 
to assist the poorest of the poor, firstly against homelessness and secondly in getting 
a space where they can live with dignity – the exact content of the latter provision 
remains a highly contested issue. In addition, there is also no precedent that the 
"home" deserves greater protection as constitutional property than other forms of 
property. 
  
                                        
case law. It is important to acknowledge that the statement in Jaftha must be understood in its 
context and therefore qualified to persons who are socio-economically vulnerable. 
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